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THE GRAND JURY-PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE OF THE INDICTMENT PROCESS
ROBERT GILBERT JOHNSTON*
INTRODUCTION
From its inception in the United States, the
grand jury has been regarded as security to the
accused against oppressive prosecution and as
protector of the community against public mal-
feasance and corruption.' Nevertheless, it is now
the subject of considerable controversy. Critics of
the grand jury argue that it is inefficient, expensive
and unnecessary. 2 In Great Britain the grand jury
was abolished in 1933. In many American juris-
dictions its powers have been limited or super-
seded by other devices or institutions.3
Significantly, this disfavor has come at a time
when there is renewed concern over the competency
and integrity of those public officials whom the
grand jury is suppose to control.4 It has occurred
* J. D., 1960, University of Chicago School of Law;
Member, Hawaii and Illinois Bars.
ISee, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390
(1962), where the Supreme Court stated that the
grand jury:
has been regarded as a primary security to the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
persecution; it serves the invaluable function
... of standing between the accuser and the ac-
cused.... to determine whether a charge is founded
upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating
power or by malice and personal ill will.
See also Dewey, Grand Jury, The Bulwark of Justice,
19 THE PANEL 3 (1941), where the grand jury is de-
scribed as the "bulwark of protection for the innocent
and the sword of the community against wrongdoers."
2 See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17
(1973); People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 33, 273 N.E.2d
380, 390 (1971); Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury
Indictment in Illinois, 1966 IL. L.F. 423 (1966); Camp-
bell, Eliminate The Grand Jury, 64 J. CRam L. & C.
174 (1973); Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role
of the Grand Jury, 10 AaR. CRm L. Rxv. 701 (1972);
Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People
or Administrative Agency of the Prosecutor?, 2 N. MEx.
L. REV. 141 (1972).
3See Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment
in Illinois, 1966 ILL. L. F. 423, 424 n.6 (1966); Harno,
Some Significant Developments in Criminal Law and
Procedure in the Last Century, 42 3. or Cns. LAW 422,
451 (1951).4 See Lumbard, The Criminal Justice Revolution and
the Grand Jury, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 397, 400 (1967), where
the author states:
We should not forget that our District Attorneys
are elected officials, that they must stand for elec-
tion at stated intervals, and this makes them
subject to pressures and temptations if they have
the power to act alone, and there are some cases
where it would not be in the public interest to
even though the grand jury has been actively
participating in the investigation and prosecution
of public corruption. It also arises amidst a grow-
ing awareness that an indictment can have serious
effects on the reputation of the accused, and force
both the accused and the state to incur the con-
siderable expenses associated with trial. 5
The purpose of this article is: (1) To identify
and explain the underlying reasons for the current
dissatisfaction with the grand jury; (2) To analyze
the reactions of our courts to these developments;
and (3) To suggest several ways in which the
operation of the grand jury can be improved. In
order to understand the basis for this dissatisfac-
tion, it is essential to look first at the evolution of
the grand jury from its common law origins to its
current structure and procedure.
THE GRAND JutY: PAST AND PRESENT
The grand jury originated in England as the
accusatory body in the administration of criminal
justice.' In the Assize of Clarendon of 1166, Henry
II established the first grand jury whose function
was to disclose under oath the names of those in
the community believed to be guilty of criminal
offensesY At one time the grand jury determined
the guilt of the accused as well as made accusa-
tions, but eventually the accusatory and guilt-
give them the sole power to determine when
arges should be brought.
5 See, e.g., Judge Frank's statement in In re Fried,
161 F.2d 453, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1947):
The government further argues that an indictment
founded upon illicit evidence will do the applicant
no harm, since such evidence will not be admitted
at the trial which follows the indictment. This is
an astonishingly callous argument which ignores
the obvious. For a wrongful indictment is no
laughing matter; often it works a grievous irrep-
arable injury to the person indicted. Prosecutors
have an immense discretion in instituting criminal
proceedings which may lastingly besmirch reputa-
tions....
SSee generally G. ADAms, TIm Ononzs OF Tr
ENGLISH CoqsruoN 106-35 (2d ed. 1935); G.
EwARns, THE GRAND Juty 1-44 (1906); L W. HOLDS-
woRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321 (7th ed.
1956); Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of
the Grand Jury, 10 AiTmR. CRns L. REv. 701 (1972).
7See L W. HoLnswoRTH, A HisTORY or ENGLISH
LAW 321 (7th ed. 1956); T. PLucomETT, A CoNcise
HISTORY OF TRR COMMON LAW 112 (5th ed. 1956).
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determining functions were divided between the
grand jury and the petit jury.8 At that stage the
grand jury undertook the task of screening out
unfounded prosecutions. Despite limited assistance
from governmental officials, the grand jury was
able to operate independently of government
influence. For the most part, the grand jurors had
personal knowledge of criminal activity, which was
supplemented by their right to interview witnesses
in private chambers.9 It is important to note that
at this time secrecy began to surround the delib-
erations of the grand jury, primarily to protect the
grand jurors and their witnesses from government
persecution.0
As a result of several instances in which the
grand jury refused to return indictments, it soon
gained considerable popularity in England as a
protective institution against government oppres-
sion. In one case, the grand jury refused to return
an indictment against Stephen College on charges
of treason." Originally, the King's counsel had
insisted that the grand jury hear in open court
testimonial evidence supporting the Crown's
allegations. Following the public hearings, how-
ever, the jurors insisted upon and obtained a
private hearing in which the grand jury alone
examined witnesses. Although the Crown expected
the usual acquiescence, the grand jury did not
indict College. The jurors refused to explain their
decision except to say that their consciences
dictated that an indictment not be returned.12 In
the same year, the Crown attempted to indict the
Earl of Shaftesbury on the same charges.1 After
examining witnesses in private chambers, the
grand jury again refused to indict the accused.
While the reasons for refusing to return indict-
ments in these cases may have stemmed from the
grand jurors' political opposition to policies of the
government, 4 the grand jury was nevertheless
sI. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISHE LAW
313, 321 (7th ed. 1956).
9 Id. at 322.
10See Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MicH. L.
Rav. 455, 457 (1965).
1 See Trial of Stephen College, at Oxford for High
Treason, 8 How. St. Tr. 550 (1681).
12 Id.
13 See Proceedings at the Old Bailey, upon a Bill of
Indictment for High Treason, against Anthony Earl of
Shaftesbury, 8 How. St. Tr. 759, 771-774 (1681).
14 The grand jury was unable to protect either Col-
lege or Shaftesbury for long. The Crown presented its
accusations against College to another grand jury who
indicted him for treason. He was subsequently con-
victed and executed. Shaftesbury was eventually
forced to flee England and died in exile. See G. TRE-
VELYAN, ENGLAND UNDER THE STuARTs 403, 404-06
(1960).
able to withstand considerable pressure from the
Crown and establish itself as an institution in-
dependent of government influence.
The English colonies in America adopted the
grand jury as part of their judicial system3 5 During
the colonial period the powers of the grand jury
expanded. It proposed new laws, protested against
abuse in government and performed many ad-
ministrative tasks. Despite proddings by royal
officials, it chose to enforce laws and to allow
prosecutions as it saw fit.
0
In one such instance the Governor's Council of
Massachusetts twice sought to indict Isaiah
Thomas, publisher of the Massachusetts Spy, who
published an article in 1772 announcing that the
Lieutenant-Governor was a "perjured traitor"
and the Governor should be removed and punished
as a "usurper.' 7 When Thomas refused to answer
to the Council for his "libel," the Council ordered
the attorney general to prosecute Thomas. But
the grand jury refused to indict. The Council then
ordered the attorney general to prosecute Thomas
by information, but public pressure forced the
Council to abandon the prosecution.18
During the American revolution, the activities
of the grand jury again expanded. As the repre-
sentative of local communities, it often became a
propoganda agency while performing its tradi-
tional and newly established powers in the com-
munity.19
Following the revolution, the federal and state
governments adopted the grand jury as part of
their judicial systems.2 0 Federal grand juries,
packed by Federalist officials, made militantly
partisan reports and advanced political prosecu-
tions against Republicans.2 In their turn, the
Republicans sought indictments against Aaron
15 R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL; THE GRAND
JURY IN T UMTED STATES 26 (1963). See generally,
Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand
Jury, 10 AmER. CRmo. L. REv. 701 (1972); Shannon,
The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Ad-
ministrative Agency of the Prosecutor?, 2 N. MEx. L.
Rv. 141 (1972).
16 R. YOUNGER, TME PEoP.E's PANEL; Tim GRAND
JURY THE UNITED STATES 26 (1963).
V See L. LEvy, FRnaom oF SPEEcH AND PREss iN
EARL AmExscAN HIsToRY 72-74 (1960).
Is Another early manifestation of grand jury inde-
pendence arose in connection with the case of Peter
Zenger. There, two New York grand juries refused to
return indictments against Zenger for statements he
made against the royal governor. See R. MoRRaS
FAIR TRrAL 69-95 (1952).
19 R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL; THE GRAND
JURY N TME UNIMD STATES 83-84 (1963).
20 Id. at 55.
2
1 Id. at 44-55.
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Burr before three different grand juries.u The first
indictment sought was before a Kentucky grand
jury for the offense of trying to involve the United
States in war with Spain, but the grand jury re-
fused to indict Burr. Undeterred, the government
sought a second indictment before a Mississippi
grand jury for the same act. The grand jury again
refused to indict Burr. Instead it filed a report
denouncing the prosecutors. The third indictment
was sought before a Virginia grand jury. Although
this grand jury returned an indictment, the prose-
cution was unsuccessful and Burr was acquitted.23
During the westward movement, the territories
and local communities adopted the grand jury.4
The territorial grand juries exercised the power to
indict and to report. Any person could address
the grand jury and could present grievances about
private or public citizens. During this period,
jurors commended those (public officials) whom
they found doing a good job, but were unfailing
in their criticism of those who were not. They did
not hesitate to use the ample powers that they
possessed to conduct searching investigations into
corruption in government and widespread evasion
of the laws.
25
In the Utah Territory, the grand jury became
embroiled in the political struggles between the
Mormons and the federal authorities. No indict-
ments against Mormon leaders were returned
despite the efforts of the federal prosecutors.
Finally, ignoring statutory authority for the
method of selecting jurors, one federal marshall
hand-picked more amenable jurors. The result
was the return of indictments against the Mormon
leaders.28 However, those indictments were even-
tually voided by the United States Supreme Court
in Clinton v. Englebredctt in which the Court held
that the method of selecting the grand jurors was
improper.
Aside from its popular support as a means of
controlling or exposing public malfeasance during
the westward movement, the grand jury also
directed its efforts against crime and corruption in
municipal government and big business:2
Under extraordinary circumstances grand juries
2' See generally, L. LEvY, JETFERsON AND CIvIL
L~nERTms: Tan DAKER SIE (1963).
23 Id. at 70-92.2 R. YOUNGER, THRE P LE's PANEL; Tan GRAND
JURY i Tam UNIED STATEs 83-84 (1963).
25 Id.261d. at 180-81.
- 80 U.S. 434 (1872).
2 R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL; Tan GRAND
JURy iu Tan UNrED STATES 208, 223 (1963).
proved that they could, if necessary, unseat an
entire municipal administration and using their
power of indictment, take over and run a city in
the name of the people. In both Minneapolis and
San Francisco, grand juries governed the city for
long periods while they rooted out crime and cor-
ruption. City bosses, corrupt officials, and
racketerring criminals learned to fear the grand
inquest, but to citizens seeking to rid their city of
corruption, it was often the only hope.29
Significantly, the grand jury was also credited
with ridding New York of public corruption at the
turn of the century."0
From these reported instances involving the
operation of the grand jury during the develop-
ment of the English and American legal systems, it
is fair to conclude that the function of the grand
jury was to investigate criminal activity and de-
cide whether to hold an accused for trial. At first
the grand jury was chosen for this task because
the grand jurors themselves were the ones who
knew of criminal activity in the community. Once
assembled, however, the grand jurors soon realized
that they could use their powers to prevent the
government from prosecuting persons for political
purposes. As with any institution given certain
powers and responsibilities, there were instances
in which the grand jury aided and abetted the
government in harassing and prosecuting certain
individuals. In many of these cases, the grand jury
was embroiled in controversial political issues
which added to its notoriety. More than anything
else, they demonstrate the need for an institution
to check the discretion of the prosecutor and pro-
tect the interests of the accused.
The principal power of the grand jury today is
to decide whether prosecutions for more serious
offenses should proceed to trial. The Federal
Constitution and some state constitutions require
that criminal proceedings for "infamous crimes"
shall be prosecuted only on a grand jury indict-
ment." Some states have similar statutory provi-
29 Id. at 208.
s0 d.
31 See Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment
in Illinois, 1966 ILL. L. F. 423, 424 n.6 (1966); Harno,
Some Significant Developments in Criminal Law and
Procedure in the Last Century, 42 J. Or Cirn. LAW 422,
451 (1951). An "infamous crime" is usually one which
exposes the accused person to one year or more con-
finement. See People v. Bradley, 7 Ill. 2d 619, 131
N.E.2d 538 (1956). The "indictment" is the written
accusation by the grand jury alleging the commission
of a crime. It is the pleading on which the person ac-
cused is prosecuted. See United States v. Bridges, 432
F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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sions. 12 In addition to the power to indict, some
jurisdictions extend the power of the grand jury
to report on public malfeasance and corruption."
The power to report may extend to situations
affecting the morals, health or general welfare; or,
it may be limited to situations affecting specific
institutions or agencies.34 However, a report, or a
presentment as it is sometimes called, is not a
pleading on which an accused may be prosecuted
in a judicial proceeding.35
%The grand jury is ordinarily convened at the
discretion of the court. The federal rules, for
example, provide that the court "shall order one
or more grand juries to be summoned at such times
as the public interest requires." 35 Under this rule
only the court may summon the grand jury; more-
over, its decision whether to summon a grand jury
is not subject to review or mandamus. The grand
jury's powers and procedures also are prescribed
to it by the court.is Once the court instructs the
grand jurors as to their powers, they are then
bound by oath or affirmation to conduct themselves
in accordance with those instructions. 9 In addi-
tion, without court process and its contempt
powers, the grand jury cannot compel a witness
to appear or testify. Even if a private person
3 See Harno, Some Signifiant Developments in Crim-
inal Law and Procedure in the Last Century, 42 J. or
Cpii. LAW 422, 451 (1951).
See Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment:" Foul
Blow or Fair Play, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 1103 (1955);
Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74
HAXv. L. Rxv. 590 
(1961).
1 See Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment:" Foul
Blow or Fair Play, 55 CoLum. L. R!v. 1103 (1955).
For example, Ir. REv. STAT., ch. 75, § 26 (1973) auth-
orizes the Illinois grand jury to examine and report to
the court as often as every other term upon the con-
dition of the Cook County Jail and the treatment of
prisoners.
3 See United States v. Bridges, 432 F.2d 692 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). See also Kuh, The Grand Jury "Present-
ment:" Foul Blow or Fair Play, 55 CoLIur. L. Rxv.
1103 (1955).
36 FED. R. Cami. P. 6(a). According to the common
law, courts have the inherent power to impanel grand
juries. See Petition of A&H Transp., Inc., 319 F.2d 69
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 924 (1963); United
States v. Wallace & Tieman, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 780
(D.D.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 349 F.2d 222
(D.C. Cir. 1965); People v. Sears, 49 IMi. 2d 14, 273
N.E.2d 380 (1971).
17See L. OnRIELD, CRIMNAL PROCEDURE UNDER
FEDERAL Rur_ s 425 (1966).
I See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 112-2 (1973).
39 Id. The court usually appoints the foreman, whom
it may remove and replace. It may also refuse to au-
thorize the expenditure of funds by the grand jury to
employ independent investigators or counsel. See
United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 300 (N.D.
Calif. 1952).
volunteers to testify, it is questionable whether
the grand jury may hear such persons. Although
according to the common law a private individual
could communicate with the grand jury, a private
communication to a grand jury except through
recognized channels may constitute contempt of
court." Thus, as a practical matter, the grand
jury today is dependent on the court for its exist-
ence and effectiveness.
In most jurisdictions the grand jury proceedings
have remained secret.4' During those proceedings,
the prosecutor may present hearsay information to
the grand jury to obtain an indictment,4 and an
indictment will normally not be dismissed even
though he presents illegally seized evidence.4
IT'H CURRENT PROBLEM
While the grand jury in England was able to
maintain considerable independence from govern-
ment prosecutors, the grand jury today is much
more dependent on the prosecutor for its successful
operation. Indeed, the grand jury normally hears
only those cases presented by the prosecutor and
only the prosecution's side of those cases."4 He is
responsible for securing the attendance of witnesses
whom he selects, and also for the presentation of
other evidence.4 He conducts the examination of
40 See People v. Sears, 49 Il. 2d 14, 31, 273 N.E.2d
380, 388 (1971). But see United States v. Smyth, 104 F.
Supp. 283, 300 (N.D. Calif. 1952), where the court
stated:
[It might be necessary for a single grand juror (in
his line of duty) to seek information in a night club,
a bar or a house of ill fame.
41 See note 82 infra. See also RED. R. Cmm. P. 6(e);
HAwAII R. Cnmm. P. 6; ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 112-
6(b) (1973).
4 See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).43See Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043
(8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Rundle, 383 F.2d
424 (3d Cir. 1967); West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50
(8th Cir. 1966); United States v. American Radiator &
Standard San. Corp., 278 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
44See, e.g., United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp.
283, 293 (N.D. Calif. 1952).
41 See Lumbard, The Criminal Justice Revolution and
the Grand Jury, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 397, 399 (1967), where
Judge Lumbard points out that:
although grand jurors are also required by law to
report any crimes of which they may have knowl-
edge themselves, as a practical matter almost all
cases presented to the grand jury are brought there
by the District Attorney.
The same proposition is put forth in Antell, The
Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51
A.B.A.J. 153, 154 (1965), but with some cynicism:
In short, the only person who has a clear idea of
what is happening in the grand jury room is the




witnesses, instructs the grand jurors as to what
laws are alleged to have been violated, and draws
the indictment.4 6 As a public official and lawyer,
the prosecutor may also command considerable
respect from the lay persons constituting the
grand jury.
With this added responsibility and power comes
the danger that the prosecutor may also be able
to prejudice or even manipulate the grand jurors
and obtain an indictment when there may not be
sufficient evidence to hold an accused for trial. This
conduct may take several forms and may occur
at different stages in the indictment process. It
may occur, for example, when the prosecutor is
permitted to use abusive language when discussing
the character of the accused before the grand jury.
The prosecutor may also attempt to create pre-
indictment publicity, which might include unsub-
stantiated factual assertions, in the hope of in-
flaming public sentiment and reaching prospective
grand jurors. The conduct may even be uninten-
tional. But if the prosecutor is successful in ob-
taining an indictment under these conditions, the
grand jury becomes the "tool" of the prosecutor
and no longer protects the interests of the ac-
cused.47 This danger may be more apparent in
41 See, e.g., United States v. Gather, 413 F.2d 1061
(D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Joao, 53 Hawaii 226, 491
P.2d 1089 (1971); People y. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 31,
273 N.E.2d 380, 389 (1971).
47The situation which arose in Hawaii recently re-
garding alleged campaign violations illustrates the way
in which the grand jury can become embroiled in politi-
cal conflicts. Following the general election in 1972,
the Honolulu prosecutor initiated prosecutions against
candidates for office for failure to report properly
campaign contributions or perjury in reporting cam-
paign contributions. Honolulu Advertiser, Jan. 17,
1973, at A-7, col. 1. During the 1972 term of the grand
jury, the prosecutor, an appointee of the successful
incumbent Democratic can did ate for mayor, presented
evidence to the grand jury against the unsuccessful
Republican candidate for mayor in the general election
and against the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for
mayor in the primary election. The grand jury did not
return indictments against either candidate, Honolulu
Advertiser, Jan. 17, 1973, at A-7, col. 1.
During the 1973 term of the grand jury, the prosecu-
tor again presented evidence to the grand jury and an
indictment was returned against the unsuccessful
Democratic candidate, who subsequently sought to
dismiss the indictment on the grounds of alleged mis-
conduct by the prosecutor. Honolulu Advertiser, May
9, 1973, at A-1, col. 1; Honolulu Advertiser, March 20,
1973, at A-7, col. 2. An indictment was also returned
against a state representative. Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
March 12, 1973, at A-i, col. 5. The indictment was later
dismissed due to insufficient evidence. Honolulu Star-
Bulletin March 12, 1973, at A-1, col. 5.
During the same period of time, the state attorney
general initiated an investigation into the campaign
cases where the accused is a public official or public
figure and the prosecutor is using the grand jury
to further his own political ends, but it may also
arise in those instances where the prosecutor's
performance is judged by the number of indict-
ments or convictions returned.4
THE JuDic.AL RESPONSE
In several recent decisions both state and
federal courts have considered the issues raised by
prosecutorial manipulation of the indictment proc-
contributions and reporting of the mayor. Following the
investigation, evidence was then presented to the grand
jury which had returned indictments against the un-
successful mayoral candidates. Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
Feb. 23, 1973, A-1, col. 1. While the first of the hearings
was underway, an assistant attorney general and the
prosecutor held "press conferences" with members of
the news media who "buzzed" around the grand jury
room. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Feb. 23, 1973, A-1, col. 1.
The grand jury met four times to hear evidence con-
cerning the mayor. However, before it completed its
proceeding, the foreman of the grand jury held the first
of his press conferences with a local newspaper. He
discussed the proceedings, including the evidence pre-
sented and alleged threats to the individual jurors.
Honolulu Star-Bulletin, March 5, 1973, at A-i, col. 1.
The court subsequently dismissed the grand jury, but
not before the attorney general had subpoened the
mayor's books and records.
Undeterred by the dismissal of one grand jury, the
attorney general made plans to present evidence to
another grand jury. However, on.the day on which the
proceeding was to begin, the court ordered the attorney
general to hold up the proceeding in order to consider
the legality of the attorney general's actions in con-
ducting the investigations. The attorney general filed
information on the next day against several of the
mayor's campaign workers for improprieties in report-
ing campaign contributions. At this writing the outcome
of these investigations is still in doubt. See State v.
Good Guys for Fasi, Crim. No. 5521 (Hawaii Sup. Ct.,
filed July 26, 1973). See also State v. Altiery, Crim. No.
45364 (Hawaii Circuit Ct., 1st Circuit, Jan. 30, 1973),
where the court dismissed the case because of prosecu-
torial misconduct occurring before the grand jury.
48 One commentator has argued that in five current
celebrated cases the decisions of the grand jury,
make at least an arguable case that in many in-
stances political officers or prosecuting attorneys
now control and direct grand juries in order to pro-
tect narrow and subjective interests contrary to the
common good and even to shield from prosecution
law officers whose conduct on its face violates the
law. To say all this is not to say that opposite con-
clusions were necessary in any or all of the cases
cited above, but rather to say that in each instance
there is at least an arguable charge of criminal con-
duct against the persons responsible for the nine
listed homicides. And in each of these instances the
grand jury said there is no such arguable case to be
raised.
Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People
or Administrative Agency of the Prosecutor, 2 N. MEx.
L. REv. 141, 166 (1972).
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ess." In State v. Joao," the prosecuting attorney,
in obtaining an indictment for murder against the
defendant, made certain statements to the grand
jurors about the credibility of his only witness after
he had given testimopy.5' The trial court found
that the grand jury might not have returned an
indictment without these statements and dismissed
the indictments. In sustaining the findings of the
trial court, the Hawaii supreme court held that the
conduct of the prosecutor violated due process of
law:
[Wlhere the indictment mechanism is employed,
it must be through a grand jury which is not only
49 Several earlier federal cases also considered the
issue of misconduct by the prosecutor before the grand
jury. In United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313 (D. Idaho
1908), where the motion to dismiss the indictment was
supported by affidavits of grand jurors alleging that
the prosecutor made statements to the grand jury about
the strength of his case against the defendant, the court
dismissed the indictment, holding that when the prose-
cutor not only expresses his opinion but urges the find-
ing of an indictment, and it is clearly shown that the
grand jurors must necessarily have been influenced,
then prejudice will be presumed. The court in support-
ing that decision stated:
[.T]o sustain such an indictment would be to estab-
lish a precedent to which political partisanship,
religious intolerance-for the latter is quite apt to
exist as the former-could point as a justification
for upholding the return of an indictment through
popular demand, public excitement, persecution,
or personal ill will.
Id. at 327.
In United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343 (N.D. N.Y.
1881), the issue before the court was the alleged mis-
conduct by the special prosecutor in presenting evi-
dence to the grand jury. Here the court asserted that
the duty of the court was to exercise supervision over
the grand jury, even if it meant removing the veil of
secrecy from around the grand jury proceeding. Id.
at 344.
In United States v. Bruzgo, 373 F.2d 383 (3rd Cir.
1967), the court was faced with the allegation that the
prosecutor threatened a witness before the grand jury.
Accepting the allegation as true, the court nevertheless
held that the threats were not prejudicial so as to create
a defect of constitutional or legal proportions. Id. at
387.
In United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 F. 765 (W.D. N.C.
1883), the court dismissed an indictment because the
prosecutor had made statements about the weight of
the evidence before the grand jury.
" 53 Hawaii 226, 491 P.2d 1089 (1971).
" The prejudicial statement made by the prosecutor
was as follows:
As Mr. Chung [Prosecuting Attorney for the City
and County of Honolulu] has said, the witness that
we will present to you this afternoon is Cole U.
Kekahuna. Very briefly, Cole Kekahuna was the
original defendant charged with the murder....
Cole Kekahuna has been in jail for31 months, and
as Mr. Chung says, he has decided to make a clear
breast. On his testimony, we seek an indictment....
Id. at 227, 491 P.2d at 1090.
'legally constituted', but also unbiased.... A
tendancy to prejudice may be presumed when, in
presenting cases to the grand jury, the trial court
finds that the prosecutor or his deputies have en-
gaged in words or conduct that will invade the
province of the grand jury or tend to induce ac-
tions other than that which the jurors in their un-
influenced judgment deems warranted on the evi-
dence fairly presented before them."
While the court did not discuss the possibility of
imposing other restrictions on the prosecutor, it
did recognize the constitutional right of an accused
to be indicted by a grant jury free of government
instigated prejudice." The Joao case is also sig-
nificant because it allowed the defendant to raise
objections over the manner in which the prosecutor
presented the evidence to the grand jury without
imposing severe burdens of proof upon the de-
fendant, and because the lower court allowed the
defendant access to the grand jury transcript to
show prejudicial conduct."
In State v. Good,5" an Arizona appellate court
also held that prosecutorial misconduct violated
due process of law. There, the prosecutor severely
castigated the defendant before the grand jury
for allegedly attempting to influence its decision."5
Citing several earlier cases which held that the
prosecutor must refrain from conducting himself
improperly, the court concluded that the prose-
" Id. at 228-29, 491 P.2d at 1091.
" Id.
uId. at 227, 491 P.2d at 1090. In McMahon v. City
and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 589, 465 P.2d 549
(1970), the Hawaii supreme court held that an official
court reporter must be present to record all evidence
presented to the grand jury. The court has subsequently
amended its rules to require that all statements made
before the grand jury be recorded. See HAwAu R. Cpan.
P. 6(d).
ii 10 Ariz. App. 556, 460 P.2d 662 (1969).
16 The crux of what the prosecuting attorney said is:
[D]eliberate sometime today and decide whether
you feel as strongly as I feel that this is an attempt
to obstruct the grand jury in the performance of
its duties.... Before, we felt that the letter was a
declaration of war on the grand jury, on the grand
jury proceedings. Its attempted to create an ob-
struction, to create havoc with our proceeding....
I feel, if you do not respond to a show of force to a
declaration of war, that to all intents and purposes
you are done. You are over with. Only for that
reason. For all the other reasons that you will
decide when you get together, I feel that that's
indicated, somebody has punched you. Now, are
you going to punch them back or are you just
going to lay down? That's my approach to it.
Id. at 559, 460 P.2d at 655.
"See Commonwealth v. Favulli, 352 Mass. 95, 224
N.E.2d 422 (1967) (prosecutor must refrain from words
or conduct that will invade the province of the grand
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cutor's conduct upset the system of checks and
balances established between the prosecutor,
judge and grand jury.u As in Joao, the court con-
cluded that the defendant need not demonstrate
actual prejudice because such a burden would not
adequately protect the defendant's rights.59
Consistent with these two state court rulings is
the decision by the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois in United States v. Di Grazia.4
Here the court also dismissed an indictment be-
cause it felt that the language used by the prose-
cutor inflamed the grand jurors against the
accused."' Without citing constitutional grounds
for its holding, the court stated that the purpose
of the grand jury as protector of the accused was
sufficient authority for its decision. 2 According
to the court, "these principles are so well grounded
in our jurisprudence as not to require elabora-
tion." 0
In contrast to these holdings, the Illinois su-
preme court in 1971 held that a trial court could
not conduct a hearing to receive testimony of
grand jurors for the purpose of demonstrating
that the prosecutor had conducted himself im-
properly before the grand jury.64 Here indictments
were returned against members of the Cook County
jury); Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 164,
134 N.E. 407 (1922) (conduct of district attorney be-
fore the grand jury grounds for his removal); Hammers
v. State, 337 P.2d 1097 (Okla. Cr. App. 1959) (the
county attorney's expressions of opinion as to the guilt
of the persons under investigation and as to the weight
of the evidence was highly prejudicial and constitutes
substantial error). Commonwealth v. Smart, 378 Pa.
630, 84 A.2d 782 (1951) (indictment can be challenged
when prosecutor has acted improperly).
6110 Ariz. App. at 558, 460 P.2d at 664.
5" Id. at 560, 460 P.2d at 666.
60 213 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
6 1 The prejudicial conduct here constituted the type
of questions posed to the accused:
Q. Are you married?
Q. To whom are your married?
Q. You have a son, don't you?
Q. Do you love your son?
Q. Why are you ashamed to answer questions
about your son?
Q. Who is the father of your child?
What right have you to refuse to answer my
questions? I'll bring you before the judge and
require you to answer my questions.
Q. What is the Fifth Amendment? Do you know
what it means?
Q. Are you an American citizen?
Id. at 234-35.
61 Id. at 235.
6Id.64People ex rd. Sears v. Romiti, 50 Il. 2d 51, 277
N.E.2d 705 (1971). See Note, A Pre-indictment Attack
on Grand Jury Proceedings, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 877
(1972).
State's Attorney's office and the Chicago Police
Department for their participation in a search of
an apartment in which two members of the Black
Panther Party were killed."5 The defendants filed
motions to dismiss the indictments, supported by
affidavits of several of the grand jurors, alleging
that:
[T]he Special State's Attorney frequently went
off the record and made derogatory comments
with respect to the veracity of some of the wit-
nesses, that one of his assistants referred to a wit-
ness as a whore, a slut and a liar, that the Special
State's Attorney expressed his opinion that the
evidence of guilt was "overwhelming", that he
scolded the grand jury for voting no bills on the
preceding day, that when one of the grand jurors
stated that an indictment was a serious thing, the
Special State's Attorney said, "Don't worry, an
indictment is nothing but a piece of paper.P
Despite these allegations, the Illinois supreme
court refused to allow challenges to the indict-
ments. The court reasoned that: (1) The secrecy
surrounding the grand jury proceeding could be
removed only in exceptional circumstances; 7
(2) The Illinois Rules of Criminal Procedure had
limited those circumstances to permit disclosure
15 For a more complete description of the factual
setting of this case, see People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14,
273 N.E.2d 380 (1971). There the special prosecutor in
what came to be known as the Black Panther case was
found guilty of contempt of court for refusing to sub-
poena certain witnesses for testimony before the grand
jury. The lower court also found certain statements
made by the prosecutor embarrassing to the court and
fined him $100. The Illinois supreme court reversed
both contempt citations, though it did state that under
certain circumstances the lower court could require the
prosecutor to subpoena witnesses.
66 People ex rd. Sears v. Romiti, 50 Ill. 2d at 67-68,
277 N.E.2d at 713 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). There
was a vigorous dissent in this case:
The action taken by the majority today renders
meaningless the principles and protections of due
process insofar as they apply to proceedings before
the grand jury. As I read the majority opinion the
action taken is to counteract the allegedly increas-
ing tendency to try some person other than the
defendant. This, of course, does not warrant the
far-reaching action taken.
Id. at 68, 277 N.E.2d at 713.
6See Gritchell v. People, 146 Ill. 175, 185, 33 N.E.
757, 760 (1893), where the Illinois supreme court stated
in part:
The hardship which an accused may suffer because
he is not allowed to go behind an indictment to see
how it has been found will be small, compared with
the incalculable mischief which will result to the
public at large from a disclosure of what the law




of testimony of witnesses appearing before the
grand jury for purposes of impeachment at trial,
but had not expanded disclosure to provide for the
use of grand jurors' statements for the purpose of
establishing the demeanor of the prosecutor be-
fore the grand jury.6 The Illinois supreme court
also concluded that the trial court could not con-
sider the motion to dismiss on grounds of pre-
indictment publicity. 69 The court argued that to
permit such an attack upon an indictment would
place a severe strain on the administration of
criminal iustice.
Though the result of the Illinois supreme court
decision on the issue of the misconduct of the
prosecutor before the grand iury does not receive
support in other recent cases, its position on the
issue of preindictment publicity has much support
in the case lawY The opinion by the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in Gorin v. United
States7 exemplifies the mood of the majority of
courts. In Gorin, the defendant, who was charged
with bribing an employee of the Internal Revenue
Service, complained of massive publicity surround-
ing his indictment," most of which was alleged to
6 The rule provides in part:
... [M]atters occurring before the grand jury other
than deliberations and vote of any grand juror may
be disclosed when the court, preliminary to, or in
conjunction with a judicial proceeding, directs such
in the interests of justice.
ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 112-6(b) (1973).6 9 People ex rel. Sears v. Romiti, 50 Ill. 2d at 63,
277 N.E.2d at 709.
'1 Id. at 62, 277 N.E.2d at 711.
71 For federal court rulings, see United States v.
Osborne, 350 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1965), aff'd. 385 U.S.
323 (1967); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st
Cir. 1963); Beck v. United States, 298 F.2d 622 (9th
Cir. 1962); United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576 (2d
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 912 (1957); United
States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. La. 1971);
United States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp.
710 (S.D. Fla. 1962), aff'd. sub. nom. Hoffa v. Lieb,
371 U.S. 892 (1962); United States v. Dioguardi, 20
F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); for state court rulings see
Commonwealth v. Monahan, 349 Mass. 139,207 N.E.2d
29 (1965); State v. Winsett, 200 A.2d 692 (Super. Ct.
Del. 1964).
7313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1963).
3The court described the publicity as follows:
It boils down, however, to news releases printed in
local newspapers and repeated in substance over
radio and television on August 26, 1961, the day
two of the appellants and Bergman were arrested,
and for the next two days, purporting to quote the
Attorney General as extolling the vigor, skill and
integrity of the Internal Revenue Service and as
saying that the Charles J. McCaffrey mentioned in
the indictment had reported Glassman's offer to
bribe him to his superiors and upon their instruc-
have been relayed to the press by prosecuting
officials.74 The court first refused to recognize a
right under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment to be indicted by grand jurors free of
government instigated prejudice, and then it dis-
missed the appeal by saying that "the publicity
complained of was not serious enough to warrant
the drastic remedy of dismissing the indictment, if,
indeed, that remedy is available at all." 7
The District Court for the Southern District of
New York has rendered the most comprehensive
ruling on the preindictment publicity issue, and
certainly the most favorable to the accused. In
United States v. Sweig,76 the defendants alleged
that the Department of justice and other govern-
mental agencies had generated publicity prior to
their indictmentsY In considering their motions
to dismiss, the court admitted that the type of
relief they sought was unprecedented, but never-
theless pointed out that:
Unless the role of the grand jury as a shield for the
citizen as well as a prosecutorial agency is to be-
come an empty slogan, there are kinds of pressures
that must obviously be avoided to the extent pos-
sible.... The generation of public animus against
a prospective defendant, with the attendant dan-
ger that grand jurors may be subjected to subtle
or explicit "demands" for prosecution... is no part
of the prosecution's business. It may be that...
such "atmospheric" influences have to be dealt
with by measures short of dismissing indictments
when the sources and causes are wholly nonofficial.
But interest in the integrity of the criminal process
may require sterner measures if the prosecution
forgets its duty ... 78
tions had pretended to go along with the plan and
is a courageous American and typifies the loyalty
and integrity of the Internal Revenue Service.
Id. at 645.
74 Id. The court did voice its disapproval of govern-
ment instigated publicity:
We do not approve of pretrial publicity, particu-
larly when it emanates from prosecuting officials.
In the interest of fair trial it is better avoided. But
the publicity here complained of was minor. It was
not continuous but was pretty much a single shot
affair. And although it related to serious crimes
involving corruption of public officials, it did not
relate to a spectacular crime likely to arouse strong




76 316 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
7Id. at 1153.
7Id. The court further developed the argument
that greater demands should be placed upon the court's
own officers by citing one of its own rules:
'With respect to a grand jury or other pending in-
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The court, however, refused to dismiss the in-
dictments because it felt that the defendants had
failed to link the news releases with the prosecut-
ing officials. It did give the defendants the oppor-
tunity to establish the necessary connection, sug-
gesting that it might be appropriate to permit the
defendants to study the grand jury minutes to
establish a claim of prejudice.79
PoLIcY CONSmERATIONS
Underlying those decisions which have refused
to remedy alleged prosecutorial misconduct are
several policy considerations. First, there is some
question as to the authority of courts, absent some
statutory or constitutional provision, to impose
restrictions on the conduct of the prosecutor in his
relations with the grand jury.80 Second, it has been
argued, most recently by the Illinois supreme
court, that to allow challenges to indictments,
particularly on the basis of preindictment pub-
vestigation of any criminal matter, a lawyer par-
ticipating in the investgation shall refrain from
making any extrajudicial statement, for dissemina-
tion by any means of public communication, that
goes beyond the public record or that is not neces-
sary to inform the public that the investigation is
underway, to describe the general scope of the
investigation, to obtain assistance in the apprehen-
sion of a suspect, to warn the public of any dangers,
or otherwise to aid in the investigation.'
Id. at 1154.
U.N. at 1155.
80 See United States v. Knowles, 147 F. Supp. 19,
21 (D.D.C. 1957), where the court stated:
The basic theory of the functions of a grand jury
does not require that grand jurors should be im-
partial and unbiased. In this respect their position
is entirely different from that of petit jurors. The
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution expressly
provides that the jury trial in a criminal case be
impartial. No such requirement in respect to grand
juries is found in the Fifth Amendment....
In Illinois the criminal code provides that an indict-
ment may be dismissed for a number of reasons, includ-
ing the following: The indictment was returned by a
grand jury improperly selected and which results in
substantial injustice to the accused; the indictment was
returned by a grand jury which acted contrary to
Section 112 (Grand Jury Section) of the code and
which results in substantial injustice to the accused;
the indictment is based solely on the testimony of an
incompetent witness. I.L. R1v. STAT. ch. 38, § 114
(1971). Arguably, since the code does not specifically
grant courts the right to dismiss on the grounds that
the prosecutor acted improperly, then they lack the
power to do so. However, Section 112 provides that the
grand jury shall hear all evidence presented by the
prosecuting attorney. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 112
(1971). By implication one could as easily argue that
Section 112 defines the limit of the prosecutor's conduct
-to present evidence. Any variation would violate the
express words of the statute, and therefore become
grounds for dismissal under Section 114.
licity, would unduly burden the administration of
criminal justice by causing great delays in bring-
ing an accused to trial." Finally, the argument has
been advanced that the secrecy surrounding the
grand jury proceeding would prohibit challenges
to indictments where the defendant must use
grand jury transcripts or take testimony from
grand jurors to sustain his claim of prejudice.P
If these reasons are accepted without exception,
they would seriously reduce the likelihood that the
81 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
elaborated upon this objection in a decision in which the
court refused to quash an indictment because illegally
seized evidence had been presented to the grand jury:
If we adopt appellants position we would be faced
with two alternatives. We could leave the essential
nature of the grand jury proceeding unchanged.
The government would then be forced to make an
ex parte determination of the legality of the offered
evidence without the guidance of opposition or
ruling from judicial authority. The penalty for
making such a mistake would be striking down of
the entire grand jury proceeding. We could on the
other hand, change the nature of the grand jury
investigation, making it into an adversary sys-
tem .... Such a change, however, would add an
additional burden to judicial time, completely
alter our judicial system, and seriously cripple the
supposedly investigatory purpose of the grand
jury-
West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50, 56 (8th Cir. 1966).
See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 3 9, 363
(1956).
82See Gritchell v. People, 146 Ill. 175, 183, 185,
33 N.E. 757, 759-60 (1893), which held:
In furtherance of justice, and upon grounds of
public policy, the law requires that the proceedings
of the grand jury room shall not be revealed ....
The hardship which an accused party may suffer
because he is not allowed to go behind an indict-
ment to see how it has been found will be small,
compared with the incalculable mischief which will
result to the public at large from a disclosure of
what the law deposits in the breast of a grand juror
as an inviolable secret. An innocent person will not
be hurt by being forbidden to thus go behind the
indictment, for he can always vindicate himself in
a trial upon the merits.
In Commonwealth v. Smart, 368 Pa. 630, 633-34,
82 A.2d 782, 784 (1951), the Pennsylvania supreme
court analyzed the role of secrecy as follows:
In view of the large amount of literature that has
been written concerning the origin and history of
the Grand Jury as one of the administrative agen-
cies of the criminal law employed for centuries
through-out the Anglo-Saxon world, it is wholly
unnecessary to attempt to elaborate on these
themes. Likewise there is no need to stress the vital
importance of the maintenance of secrecy in regard
to the deliberations and proceedings of Grand
Juries, for the policy of the law in that respect
has been so long established that it is familiar to
every student of the law.... Generally speaking,
the rule is that grand jurors cannot be sworn and
examined to impeach the validity and correctness




grand jury would operate to check the prosecutor
and protect the accused. Examination of each of
them, however, reveals that none justify severe
limitations on the power of a court to hear chal-
lenges for prosecutorial misconduct nor do they
justify restricting the ability of the accused to
prove grand jury prejudice.
Although no provision of the United States
Constitution specifically guarantees the right of
an accused to be indicted by a grand jury free of
prosecutorial instigated prejudice, 3  a strong
historical basis exists for holding that the grand
jury should operate to control abuses by the gov-
ernment and protect the interests of the accused.s,
Since the prosecutor now plays a much more
significant role in the indictment process, the
judiciary may have to take more positive action to
insure that the grand jury functions effectively,
but that action would be consistent with the pur-
poses underlying the existence of the grand jury.
Such action would also be consistent with the
relationship which has developed between the
court and the grand jury in which the courts have
assumed the responsibility of assembling, instruct-
ing and overseeing the actions of the grand jurors.5
If, for example, the court determined that the
prosecutor had violated his duty to the grand jury,
it could refuse to allow its process and authority to
be used in furtherance of that violation. The court
might also suspend the proceedings until the viola-
tions were corrected.
8 6
It is important to note that the Hawaii supreme
court and the Arizona appellate court suggested
an alternative basis for allowing challenges to
indictments on the grounds of prosecutorial mis-
conduct. According to both courts, a defendant
8 The United States Supreme Court has considered
the issue of grand jury bias under the fourteenth amend-
ment, but failed to hold that lack of grand jury objec-
tivity constituted a violation of due process of law.
See note 87 infra.
84 See note 1 supra.
81 As put by one court:
A grand jury has no existence aside from the court
which calls it into existence and upon whom it is
attending. A grand jury does not become, after it is
summoned, an independent planet, as it were, in
the judicial system, but still remains an appendage
of the court on which it is attending.... A court
would not be justified, even if it were so inclined,
to create or call into existence a grand jury, and
then go off and leave it. A supervisory duty, not
only exists, but is imposed upon the court, to see
that its grand jury and its process are not abused,
or used for purposes of oppression and injustice.
In re National Window Glass Workers, 287 F. 219, 225
(N.D. Ohio 1925).88See notes 39-45 supra.
who has been indicted by a grand jury which has
been prejudiced by the prosecutor has been denied
due process of law. While the United States
Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, it has
indicated that it may be willing to extend due
process protections to the indictment procedures
established by the states. In Beck v. United States,n3
the Court stated:
It may be that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires the state, having once
resorted to a grand jury procedure, to furnish an
unbiased grand jury.... But we find that it is not
necessary for us to determine this question; for
even if due process would require a state to furnish
an unbiased body once it resorted to a grand jury
procedure-a question which we do not remotely
intimate any view-we have concluded that Wash-
ington, so far as shorwn by the record, did so in this
case.89
While the issue remains unsettled, both the state
and federal courts still have sufficient supervisory
control over the grand juries to reduce the possi-
bility that the prosecutor will be able to prejudice
the interests of the accused.
The caveat about the undesirability of turning
the indictment process into a trial on the merits
deserves special attention, since significant changes
in the grand jury proceeding could have a marked
effect on the administration of criminal justice. 0
However, those courts which have heard challenges
to indictments on grounds of prosecutorial mis-
conduct have not suggested vast changes in the
operation of the grand jury, or changes which
would delay the speedy trial of the defendant.
8 See notes 50, 55 Supra.
369 U.S. 541 (1962). In this case the defendant had
been investigated at highly publicized hearings by a
subcommittee of the United States Senate. Beck was
subsequently indicted by a Washington grand jury for
improper use of union funds. He was convicted and his
conviction was upheld by the Washington supreme
court. The United States Supreme Court upheld the
conviction.
It should be noted that the Court was considering the
issue of grand jury bias in general, not merely bias
created by the prosecutor or other government officials.
This article takes the position that government insti-
gated prejudice must be controlled to insure that the
grand jury can operate to check the prosecutor. It is
not intended to deal with the broader issue of grand
jury bias from other sources such as adverse publicity
generated solely by the press. See generally, Bartlett,
Defendant's Rigd to an Unbiased Federal Grand Jhry,
47 B.U.L. Rtv. 551 (1967).
89 Id. at 546.
90As a countervailing consideration, however, it
should be noted that an indictment can work serious
harm to an accused. See note 5 supra.
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They have advocated a review limited to the
determination of the demeanor of the prosecutor
in his relations with the grand jury or the press.
The court would not have to weigh the evidence
against the accused, but would only have to de-
cide whether the prosecutor has properly presented
his case to the grand jury. This procedure would
place the prosecutor on notice that if he acts im-
properly, the court will take appropriate action. 91
In the case of pre-indictment publicity, review
would be limited to publicity actually generated
by the prosecutor or other government officials, 92
and to the determination of whether the grand
jurors have been exposed to the publicity. Courts,
however, need not limit their actions to a review
of grand jury proceedings only after an indictment
has been returned. As pointed out before, courts
which assemble grand juries have the responsi-
bility of supervising their operations." Proper
instructions to grand jurors and continued super-
vision over grand jury proceedings could remove
the defects caused by prosecutorial improprieties.
Finally, the need to maintain grand jury secrecy
has been used to justify limitations on challenges
to indictments. Courts have done so by severely
limiting access to grand jury transcripts, or by
refusing to allow the accused to question the grand
jurors once the indictment has been returned."
At present, courts have advanced four reasons
for maintaining grand jury secrecy: (1) To insure
freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations; (2)
To prevent the escape of the accused; (3) To pre-
vent tampering with grand jury witnesses; (4)
To protect those who have been investigated but
not indicted.95 Although these reasons may justify
secrecy while the grand jury is assembled and con-
sidering evidence, they are much less significant
(1) once the indictment has been returned, (2)
when the defendant himself is attempting to go
behind the indictment, and (3) when the reason
for lifting secrecy is to expose the misconduct of
the prosecutor. Since an indictment becomes
public knowledge soon after it has been returned,
secrecy need not be maintained to prevent the
escape of the accused. Once the accused has been
indicted, it is no longer necessary to protect his
reputation. And pre-trial discovery will normally
91 See notes 36-40 supra.
2 See notes 72-79 supra.93 See note 85 supra.
94 See note 64 supra.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3rd
Cir. 1954); Gritchell v. People, 146 IIl. 175, 33 N.E.
757 (1893).
reveal the identity of witnesses and their expected
testimony, so that the threat of witness tampering
will exist whether or not the grand jury proceed-
ings are disclosed. Furthermore, the discovery
which would be necessary to demonstrate the mis-
conduct would not require disclosure of grand jury
deliberations or vote, and would normally come
after the indictment had been returned. In the
case of pre-indictment publicity, the defendant
might need to question grand jurors to determine
whether they have been subjected to prosecutorial
instigated publicity, but again the scope of the
investigation would be very limited and subject to
the discretion of the court.96 If the court needed to
investigate charges prior to indictment, it could
make an in camera inspection of the minutes of the
proceedings, or interrogate the grand jurors in
private chambersY7
Within the last several years there have been
significant legislative enactments which recognize
that under certain circumstances disclosure would
be permissible. For example, Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now allows
virtually anyone associated with the grand jury
to give testimony about what happened at the
proceedings upon a showing that grounds may exist
for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury.Y Rule
96 It should be noted that in many instances the grand
jurors will be the only ones who can identify the prose-
cutor's misconduct, since the defendant is not repre-
sented at the grand jury and the record may be silent
as to certain exhortations which the prosecutor mhakes.
By denying the defendant the authority to use grand
jurors' testimony a court might be eliminating his
only means of demonstrating the misconduct. The
authority to take testimony of grand jurors has.been
sustained in several cases. See United States v. Bruzgo,
373 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Wells,
163 F. 313 (D. Idaho 1908); United States v." Kil-
patrick, 16 F. 765 (W.D. N.C. 1883); United States v.
Farrington 5 F. 343 (N.D. N.Y. 1881); State v. Will,
97 Iowa 58, 65 N.W. 1010 (1896); State v. Kifer, 186
La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937); Attorney General v. Pel-
letier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N.E. 407 (1922); State v.
Manney, 24 N.J. 571, 133 A.2d 313 (1957).
9This procedure has been sustained by the Illinois
supreme court. See People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 273
N.E.2d 380 (1971).
93 The rule in part provides:
[A] juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer,
operator of an operating device, or any typist who
transcribes recorded testimony may disclose mat-
ters occurring before the grand jury only when so
directed by the court preliminary to or in conjunc-
tion with a judicial proceeding or when permitted
by the court at the request of the defendant upon a
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to
dismiss because of matters occurring before the
grand jury.
FED. R. Cnr. P. 6(e)
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6(b) of the Illinois Rules of Criminal Procedure
permits disclosure of matters other than accounts
of deliberations or votes when a court directs such
in the interests of justice.9 Closely associated with
the federal rule are several United States Supreme
Court decisions which hold that a defendant has a
right to the testimony of witnesses appearing
before a federal grand jury when he can show a
particular need for this testimony' 00
What these changes suggest is a more pragmatic
approach to the issue of grand jury secrecy. As
urged by one court:
Secrecy for secrecy sake should no longer be the
rule.... Rather, the maintenance of the wall of
secrecy around grand jury testimony should be
grounded on sound reason10l
The position that defendants should be able to
investigate grand jury minutes, or question grand
jurors once an indictment has been returned, to
establish the demeanor of the prosecutor does not
violate the policies underlying the mdintenance of
grand jury secrecy, and is also consistent with the
approach taken by recent legislative enactments.
91 See note 28 supra. The Illinois supreme court in
People ex rd. Sears v. Romiti, 50 Ill. 2d 51, 63, 277
N.E.2d 705, 711 (1971), interpreted this rule very
narrowly to limit the methods by which the defendants
could demonstrate the prosecutor's misconduct. The
dissent countered this interpretation by arguing:
The majority traces the origin of the 1965 amend-
ment of section 112-6 to Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. We agree that failure
to include in the statute the provision of 6(e) for
disclosure upon a showing 'that grounds may exist
for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury' is signifi-
cant. Under the prior holdings of the court, how-
ever, its significance is precisely opposite to that
attributed to it by the majority. A basic rule of
statutory construction is that enumeration of
certain matters in a statute implies the exclusion
of all others, and the corrollary rule is that excep-
tions other than those designated by statute cannot
be read into it.... It is apparent, therefore, that
the amendment to section 112-6 authorizes dis-
closure "in the interest of justice" and not as the
majority holds-in the interests of justice except
under circumstances which the majority does not
approve.
Id. at 66; 277 N.E.2d at 712-13 (Goldenhersh, J.,
dissenting).
100 United States v. Dennis, 384 U.S. 855 (1966);
United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677
(1958).
101 Parpliano v. District Court, 176 Colo. 521, 527,
491 P.2d 965, 968 (1971). See also United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1972); In re Proceedings before
the Grand Jury Summoned October 12, 1970, 321
F.Supp. 238 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
CONCLUSION
Because the grand jury is dependent upon the
prosecutor, it is often called by its critics a "rubber
stamp" or "tool" of the prosecutor. It is beyond
debate that the grand jury in the vast majority of
cases returns an indictment. Moreover, it is clear
that the prosecutor need not offer an extensive
evidentiary case to obtain an indictment. However,
this does not lead to the conclusion that the grand
jury merely reflects the will of the prosecutor no
matter what safeguards are provided to insure that
the prosecutor presents his case properly.
If a person is arrested without a warrant, he is
processed by the police. Presumably the officer
making the arrest had some basis for his decision
to arrest, and this decision may have been reviewed
by another officer.I °2 The accused is usually taken
without unnecessary delay before a judicial officer
to advise him of his rights and set bail.10 3 At least
in some jurisdictions, the decision to arrest is
reviewed by a judicial officer to determine whether
probable cause existed for the arrest 04 If a person
is arrested with a warrant, similar procedures
attach. The initial decision to present the com-
plaint to the judicial officer for a warrant may also
be reviewed by the prosecutor.
In view of these screening procedures, it is
reasonable to conclude that the police are present-
ing cases for which there is a substantial basis to
believe that an offense has been committed. A
high indictment rate may be evidence that the
prosecutor and his staff are doing their jobs
properly.
0 5
The attempts of courts to place checks on the
prosecutor when he is clearly violating his duty to
101 See Graham & Leturn, The Preliminary Hearing in
Los Angeles; Some Field Findings and Legal Policy
Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. R.v. 635 (1971).
103 FED. R. Csu. P. S.
104 See Commentary, Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 5,
48 F.R.D. 551, 566 (1970).
105 It is possible to argue that no matter what precau-
tionary measures are taken the grand jury will always
act as a "rubber stamp" for the prosecutor. If this were
true, the opponents of the grand jury would have a
strong argument for its abolition. However, this posi-
tion has not been supported by any objective study,
such as those made in connection with the operation of
the petit jury. See, e.g., Bronson, On the Conviction
Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified
Jury: An Emprical Study of Colorado Venireman, 42
CoLo. L. Rxv. 1 (1970); Jurow, New Data on the Effect
of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination
Process, 84 HAmv. L. Rnv. 567 (1971) Kalven, A Study
of the California Death Penalty Jury in First-Degree-
Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1297 (1969): See also
G. SCHuBERT, TnE JuniciA MIND (1965)
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the grand jury have met with varying success. If
the affidavits of the grand jurors in the Romiti
case TM were accurate, the indictments were ex-
tracted by the special states attorney in an un-
conscionable manner. Those courts which have
dismissed indictments for such conduct have taken
action consistent with the purpose of the grand
jury, and yet not disruptive of its fundamental
operations. In addition, they have established
procedures to avoid the loss of public confidence
in the institution of the grand jury and the financial
costs associated with unnecessary prosecutions.
Most importantly, they have reduced the possi-
106 See note 64 supra.
bility that an innocent accused will have to- go
through the ordeal and expense of trial.
To further these goals, the judiciary and the
legislature, where appropriate, should provide
defendants with access to grand jury transcripts,
or allow them to interview grand jurors-after
indictment, when necessary for the purpose of
establishing prosecutorial misconduct. At the same
time our courts should take a more active role
during the indictment process to insure the-proper
functioning of the grand jury. Once this is; ac-
complished, the foundation can then be estab-
lished for the grand jury to operate as protector
of the accused.
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